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DEFECTIVE COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN SOFTWARE
LIABILITY IN 3D BIOPRINTED HUMAN ORGAN
EQUIVALENTS
By Jamil Ammar †
Three-dimensional (3D) bioprinting offers the exciting prospect
of printing 3D multicellular human organs by combining a host of
specialisms, including software development, biotechnology and tort
law. 3D bioprinting methods rely on highly specialized computer
software that incorporates computer-aided design (CAD). Optimizing
development of CAD software is paramount to the quality of the final
bioprinted organ. This optimization is computationally intensive, and
its success plays a critical role in regulating key aspects of the final
bioprinted organ, such as mechanical and cell growth properties of the
scaffold, behavior, and cell differentiation.
Policies underlying strict product liability law are highly relevant
to ‘defective’ CAD software. Given the potentially life threatening
impact of defective software, this article proposes that the U.S. rethinks
its approach to liability of such defective software. This article
proposes a policy-based approach that could be adapted to determine
which aspects of the manufacturing process of a bioprinted human
organ justify the added consumer protection provided by strict product
liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Three-dimensional (3D) bioprinting is an emerging industry that
offers the exciting prospect of printing, in 3D, multicellular human
organ equivalents (organ equivalent devices or ‘OEDs’) for use in a
clinical disease setting.1 Such 3D bioprinting methods rely on
computer-aided design (CAD) and computer aided manufacturing
(CAM) in order to design, and manufacture OEDs. First, specialized
executable CAD software must be created by the CAD developer. This
CAD software is then used by the ‘CAD user’ to create a bespoke
(patient-specific) 3D CAD model of the patient’s organ that can be
used for bioprinting (the ‘CAD print file’); this CAD print file is
typically derived from 3D image data obtained from methods such as
computed tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).2
1

Sean Murphy & Anthony Atala, 3D Bioprinting of Tissues and Organs, 32 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 773 (2014).
2
Wei Sun, Binil Starly, Jae Nam & Andrew Darling, Bio-CAD modeling and its applications in
computer-aided tissue engineering, 37 COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN 1097 (2005).
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The creation of the CAD print file presents two key technical
challenges: (i) replication of intricate organ micro-architecture and (ii)
organization of multiple cell types at a resolution that is sufficient to
manufacture a fully functional organ.3 A typical human organ consists
of multiple cell types, including specific functional, structural, and
supportive cells.4 Finally, the CAD print file is used to manufacture the
final OED using bioprinting methods.
Creating the optimum CAD print file is paramount to successful
OED bioprinting, since the design of that file plays a key role in
determining the mechanical properties of the OED’s cell scaffold (the
structure providing support to 3D bio-printed cells to multiply), cell
growth, cell dynamics and differentiation.5 The final use of the CAD
software, via the CAD print file, therefore, has an indisputably specific
set of characteristics that must be taken into account when assessing
the concept of liability during CAD software design and development.
While offering enormous benefits, methods of CAD software
development may carry generic risks for which liability rests with the
developer.6 This is particularly significant for OED manufactures,
since OED quality relies heavily, albeit not exclusively, on CAD
software quality.
In the medical 3D bioprinting field, three theories are, in principle,
relevant to the protection of the patient against injuries that are
attributable to defective CAD software: (i) medical malpractice (a
subset of negligence law),7 (ii) breach of warranty under the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC),8 and (iii) strict liability. None of these
theories, however, adequately address the range of injuries that could
potentially arise due to use of defective CAD software. This article will
explore these issues in the framework of the ongoing conflict between
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. In this context, 3D
bioprinting creates the possibility of extending theories of liability;
redefining the parameters of tort liability where healthcare providers
3

Murphy & Atala, supra note 1, at 773-85.
Murphy & Atala, supra note 1, at 780.
5
Dong-Woo Cho, Jung-Seob Lee, Jinah Jang, et. al., ORGAN PRINTING 5-2 (Morgan & Claypool
Publishers) (2015).
6
Broadly speaking, absent a consensual agreement to the contrary, the manufacturer of a given
product, including medical devices, is liable for its quality, reliability and safety and thus might
be held accountable for any resulting damages.
7
Malpractice is a type of negligence occurs when a licensed professional (like a doctor, lawyer
or accountant) fails to provide services as per the standards set by the governing body (‘standard
of care’). Negligence is a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances. It applies to harm caused by carelessness, not intentional harm.
8
See e.g., Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS, 850 F. Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. III. 2012)
(alleging defective software pleaded as a breach of warranty).
4
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provide both semi-traditional manufacturing and healthcare services.
The definitions of software developer, fabricator, or manufacturer
(rather than healthcare provider), and, equally important for our
discussion here, the products versus services dichotomy, will be
scrutinized.
From the perspective of product liability, courts in the U.S.
consider computer software to be a service rather than a product. To
date, courts have been reluctant to extend theories of product liability
to software.9 In the same context, the near-unanimous common wisdom
and current holding of courts is that the primary function of hospitals
and other healthcare providers is to provide services rather than to sell
products.10 This creates a technical dichotomy that to date has created
an immunity for healthcare providers and medical professionals against
strict liability claims for the effects of products used ‘incidentally’ in
the provision of healthcare. The manufacturers of those products,
however, may still be subject to strict liability law.
Product liability is a critical policy issue in the field of 3D
bioprinting. It is necessary to reconsider the premise that software
developers, especially in a healthcare setting, are not intrinsically
subject to strict liability rules in relation to the software they provide.
Such an extensive immunity, while justified in a conventional health
care setting, is poorly-suited to the 3D bioprinting age for which
software errors can cause actual physical injury to patients. Liability
regimes currently consist of a collection of different legal systems that
do not properly fit the needs of OED manufactures due to the fact that
OED bioprinting combines both products and services.11 Healthcare
professionals, medical device manufacturers, and medical software
developers have, traditionally, been clearly separated; this is no longer
the case, particularly when OED design and bioprinting are carried out
by the same entity.

See generally, ClearCorrectOperating, LLC v. Inter’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, 188 F.Supp. 2d 1264 ( D. Colo. 2002)(“holding that computer
games are not products for strict liability purposes”); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198
F.Supp.2d 167, 173 (D. Conn. 2002)(indicating that interactive “virtual reality technology” is not
a “[product] for the purposes of strict products liability”); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F.Supp.
2d 798, 810 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (stating that “[w]hile computer source codes and programs are
construed as ‘tangible property’ for tax purposes and as ‘goods’ for UCC purposes, these
classifications do not indicate that intangible thoughts, ideas, and messages contained in computer
video games, movies, or internet materials should be treated as products for purposes of strict
liability”), aff’d, 300 F.3d 683, 700–01 (6th Cir. 2002) (software makers and website operators
did not deal in “products”).
10
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 123 N. E. 2d 792, 795 (N.Y. 1954) (arguing that medical
care provider provides patients with services not goods).
11
Murphy, supra note 1.
9
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The significance of CAD software to the bioprinting process
originates from three notable characteristics. First, unlike the case of
electronic and mechanical assemblies, software failures always arise
due to development or engineering defects.12 Second, a software-based
medical device is generally more complicated and technically
demanding than software used to produce other conventional
electronics. The overwhelming majority of ‘conventional’ software
cannot be fully tested for every combination of potential pathway
through the software source code.13 It follows that not all 3D
bioprinting software defects can be fully tested for every combination
of potential pathways through the software source code either; this has
potentially far-reaching significance given the importance of CAD
software in determining the quality of the final bioprinted OED.
Thirdly, from a welfare standpoint, apart from the potential costs of
human harm or even death, it is considerably cheaper to correct
software defects early rather than late in the development lifecycle.14
Using this welfare argument, it can be argued that strict liability could
be extended to aspects of CAD development given the fact that the
CAD developer is in a strong position to discourage the development
of defective software through arguments of cost-effectiveness.
In this context, one should ask how the law should treat suits
brought by victims of defective CAD software in the field of OED
manufacturing. In this article, we shall look for liability on the part of
two potential defendants: (i) healthcare providers that use CAD print
files, both organizing and controlling the bioprinting processes within
their premises (CAD users), and (ii) non-manufacturing developers of
CAD print files (a CAD developer who produces an executable CAD
program but does not herself use the CAD program to create OEDs or
files to print OEDs).
The main article will be structured as follows. First, we will
discuss how and why the OED bioprinting industry presents serious
legal and technical challenges in the fields of professional and product
liability, especially regarding defective CAD development. We will
then investigate the possibility of extending liability for defective CAD
software to manufacturing and non-manufacturing healthcare
providers; here we will highlight the need to clearly set out the general
obligations of the CAD developer, alongside the obligations of the
healthcare providers that use the CAD software during OED
12

David Vogel, MEDICAL DEVICE SOFTWARE VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND COMPLIANCE 27
(Artech House, 2011).
13
See generally, Id., at 27.
14
Id. at 34.
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manufacturing. These discussions will be guided by the hypothesis that
the majority of relevant regulations and guidance documents have been
developed with conventional medical devices firmly in mind.15 We will
conclude by suggesting a promising approach for addressing the
liability challenge in the context of defective software development.
I. REGULATORY REGIMES FOR 3D BIOPRINTING OF OEDS: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION
There is not currently a set of specific regulations that adequately
meet the quality, safety and efficacy requirements of OED
manufacturing. Depending on how a manufactured OED is ultimately
characterized, the OED itself falls under a vast body of law,
regulations, and guiding documents, none of which adequately covers
the liability issues that might arise from use of defective CAD software.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) draft guidance titled
“Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured Devices”, as an
example,16 clearly states that it does not address the use or
“incorporation of biological, cellular, or tissue-based products in AM
(additive manufacturing).”17 Here, it is useful to keep in mind that a 3D
bioprinted OED is an implantable surgically invasive medical body
part equivalent; in other words, OEDs are intended to be surgically
introduced into the human body. Therefore, OEDs must be ‘designed’
and bioprinted (manufactured) in such a way that, when implanted
under suitable conditions and for the defined purpose, they do not
compromise the clinical condition or safety of the patient.

15

None of the currently applicable regulations and guidance documents apply to 3D bio-printing
of human organs. Examples include, The Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured
Devices: Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (May 10,2016). Page 2 explicitly excluded manufactured tissues and
organs. The Recital 13 of Regulation 2017/745 of the European Parliament (April 5, 2017) also
excludes products containing viable tissues or cells of human or animals origin from the scope of
this Regulation. Recital 8 and Article 2 (c) exclude human organs from the scope of Directive
2004/23/EC on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing,
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells, (OJ) L. 102/48
7.4.2004 (2004).
16
Technical Considerations for Additive Manufactured Devices: Draft Guidance for Industry and
Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES
(May 10,2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/gu
idancedocuments/ucm499809.pdf.
17
Id. at 2. See also, Regulatory Considerations for Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue Based Products: Minimal Manipulation and Homologous Use, Guidance for Industry
and Food and Drug Administration Staff, FDA (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/biologicsbloodvaccines/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformat
ion/guidances/cellularandgenetherapy/ucm585403.pdf.
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Based on the risks that OEDs present, the current regulatory
regime in the U.S. establishes various levels of oversight for
‘conventional’ and 3D printed medical devices. Devices that are
purported or represented to be used in “supporting or sustaining human
life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health,” (Class III) or that present a “potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury” are subject to the most rigorous
testing process and federal oversight.18 A manufacturer of a Class III
device must submit what is typically a multivolume application that
includes, among other things, full reports of all studies and
investigations of the device’s safety and effectiveness; these studies
should have been published or should reasonably be known to the
applicant. Among other requirements, the applicant must also provide
a ‘full statement’ of the device’s “components, ingredients, and
properties and of the principle or principles of operations.”19 Only once
the device’s safety and effectiveness are reasonably assured is it
possible to grant approval.20 The FDA must “weig[h] any probable
benefit to health from the use of the device against any probable risk of
injury or illness from such use.”21
In summary, the result of this regulation is that the FDA can
approve a device that presents significant risk as long as it also offers
sufficient patient benefit in the context of available alternatives.22 Class
III devices are subject to reporting requirements.23 Thus, any new
clinical or scientific studies concerning the device that the applicant is
aware of or should reasonably be aware of, as well as incidents in which
the device may have caused or contributed to death or serious injury,
or malfunctioned in a manner that would likely cause or contribute to
death or serious injury if it recurred, must all be reported to the FDA.24
Broadly speaking, satisfying the safety criterion is a matter of riskbenefit analysis; effective medical devices are rarely risk-free. The
FDA, which is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring
the safety, efficacy, and security of biological products, employs two
18

Examples include replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker
pulse generators; Classification of Devices Intended for Human Use, 21 U.S.C § 360c (2017).
19
21 U.S.C § 360e(c)(1)(B) (2017).
20
21 U.S.C § 360e(d)(2) (2017).
21
21 U.S.C § 360c(a)(2)(C) (2017).
22
For example, the FDA approved a ventricular assist device for children with failing hearts, even
though the survival rate of children using the device was less than 50 percent. See FDA, CENTER
FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, Debakey VAD Child Left Ventricular Assist SystemH030003, Summary of Safety and Probable Benefit 20 (2004), http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/
pdf3/H030003b.pdf.
23
21 U.S.C § 360i (2017).
24
21 C.F.R § 814.84(b)(2) (2013),
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specific regulatory tools: (i) the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(as amended), and (ii) Regulation 21 CFR (800-1299). Of particular
significance to our discussion is Part 820 of the Code (Quality System
Regulations).25 In the U.S., Section 351 of the Public Health Act and
Title 21, Part 1271 of the CFR (Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products) are also relevant. The latter regulates stem cellbased medical devices (often referred to as somatic cell therapies or
biologics).26 Other voluntary initiatives are also utilized, including
FDA guidelines, industry standards and information reports.
A device that is manufactured from or that incorporates human
tissues is typically regulated as a human cell, tissue, or cellular- or
tissue-based product (HCT) under 21 CFR Parts 1270 and 1271.27 Both
Parts require tissue establishments to, among other things, test donors
and prepare and follow written procedures for the prevention of the
spread of disease. 28 It should be noted that vascularized human organ
transplants, such as kidney, liver, and heart transplants, are not
regulated under this part; instead, transplantations are overseen by the
Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA). 29 It is yet to be
decided if OEDs will be classified as tissue-based products. In the
meantime, this vast body of law, regulations and guiding documents
are, at best, partially applied.
A. Intersection between Traditional Tort Liability and CAD
Software
Here we will survey the U.S. legal framework for software
development liability. Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive review
of the minutiae of black letter liability law, but rather to identify the
building blocks for moving forward. U.S. tort liability laws consist of
a conglomeration of legal regimes that include negligence, strict
liability or a combination of the two.30 Negligence is a fault-based
system whereby a customer who has suffered loss or damage resulting
25

21 C.F.R § 820.30 (2019) applies to medical device software professionals. 21 C.F.R §§ 820.30,
820.70 are Design Control Regulations (regulating how a medical device, designed, developed,
reviewed, tested, and documented). Section 820.70 regulates production and process controls. 21
C.F.R § 820.70 (2019).
26
21 C.F.R § 1271.10 (2014).
27
Examples include, bone, skin, corneas, heart valves, and hematopoietic stem/progenitor cells
derived from peripheral all fall under this category.U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
Tissue & Tissue Products (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/tissuetissueproducts/default.htm.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 281-503 (1934); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 504-24 (1938).
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from defective software can bring an action in negligence against the
software developer;31 defective software development typically falls
under this broad category. This common form of legal action will be
discussed briefly later. In contrast, the strict liability doctrine is based
on the notion that a manufacturer is liable for product defects,
regardless of fault.32 For reasons that will become clear shortly, neither
strict liability nor negligence regimes can be applied adequately to
software development in the field of OED manufacturing. Here, we
will solely examine the possibility of extending the liability of the CAD
developer under the uncommon strict liability path. In this context, 3D
bioprinting methods create a number of liability-related challenges that
are yet to be addressed.
In the U.S., common-law strict liability standards rely on either
the Restatement (Second) of Torts33 or Restatement (Third) of Torts.34
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the task of establishing a
product defect includes an analysis of consumer expectation, risk
utility, and manufacturing quality.35 In contrast, the test to determine
whether a product is defective under Restatement (Third) of Torts
raises three interrelated sources of defect: (i) manufacturing defects,
(ii) development defects, and (iii) defects related to inadequate user
instructions or warnings.36 A key point to note here is that integrating
different components into a product might introduce certain dangers
for which liability rests with the patient. Provided that the supplied
components are not defective and the component supplier has not
participated in the product design, the component supplier is normally
under no duty to warn end-users of any dangers in the product in which
their components are incorporated.37 In all cases, strict liability does
not apply unless the said defective product was sold by a person or
entity engaged in the ‘business of selling’.38 Manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, and distributors are all considered to be involved
31

This common form of legal action will be briefly addressed here.
David Owen & Mary Davis, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5:29 (4th ed. 2016).
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (Am. Law inst.1965).
34
Patrick Comerford & Erik Belt, 3DP, AM, 3DS and Product Liability, 55 SANTA CLARA L.REV.
821, 825-30, 832, 835- 36 (2015).
35
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A reads: “(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold”.
36
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY. § 1- 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
37
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 5; see also, Comerford, supra note
34 (discussing supplier’s duty to warn under the third restatement of torts).
38
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 35, §402A (1) (A).
32
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in the ‘business of selling’.39 Strict liability, however, does not apply
to occasional sales.40 Nonetheless, a seller need not be exclusively
engaged in selling the product category that caused injury to the
plaintiff for liability to attach.41
Computer software is commonly characterized as a service rather
than a product. To date, courts have been reluctant to extend product
liability theories to defective software.42 The Restatement (Third) of
Torts defines a product as a ‘tangible’ property.43 In ClearCorrect
Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission44, the Federal
Circuit pointed out that a digital 3D printing file (CAD) is not an
‘article’ under the Tariff Act of 1930 because digital files are not
“material things and thus not articles.” Software that was developed
specifically for a customer’s needs is considered to be a service.45 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, lists electricity as an intangible
item that qualifies as a product for the purposes of tort liability.46
Brocklesby v. United States 47 followed a similar path, holding that an
aeronautical chart was a defective ‘product’ under Section 402A. The
Court in Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co. also concluded that an
instrument approach chart was a ‘product’, and hence subject to strict
liability.48 The Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, clearly and
categorically excludes human tissue, even when provided
commercially, from the scope of strict liability.49
Here one should ask whether 3D bioprinting renders parts product
liability obsolete, but we believe that parts of product liability are not
necessarily obsolete. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons,50 the Ninth
Circuit drew an analogy between defective computer software and
39

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §402A (1964).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCT LIABILITY; see also, Comerford, supra note 34.
41
Id.
42
James v. Meow Media, Inc., supra note 9 at 810.
43
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 19.
44
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. International Trade Com’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287-1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
45
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp, 925 F. 2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); Data Processing Serv. v. L.H.
Smith Oil Corp, 492 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
46
‘When the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and
use of tangible personal property’. See Smith v. Homes Light, 695 P.2d (Colo. App. 1984);
Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); see also, Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s,
938 F. 2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991). The Restatement (Third) of Torts states: “Human blood and
human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules of this Restatement.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 19(c) (Am. Law Inst. 1998).
47
Brocklesby v. U.S., 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 (9th Cir. 1985).
48
Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 70-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
49
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 19(c).
50
Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).
40
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defective products, suggesting that defective software and defective
products might be equitable for the purpose of strict product liability.51
Another interesting view is offered by Corley v. Stryker Corp., in which
a single-use cutting guide was designed and manufactured from a 3D
model of a patient’s anatomy using computer software (Class II
medical device).52 In this case, the plaintiff’s allegation that the
software was defective because the cutting guide that was used during
surgery was “unreasonably dangerous in design due to the alleged
software defects” survived a motion to dismiss. 53
The imposition of strict liability, however, can be avoided by
invoking the unavoidably unsafe product defense. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §402A, comment k (1965), acknowledges that some
products are “quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use.” The seller of such products is not to be held to strict
liability for “unfortunate consequences attending their use.” 54 This
defense under §402A applies to ‘design defects’ rather than
manufacturing defects; 55 it is intended to protect products that cannot
be designed to be more safe from strict liability.56 It is not yet
determined whether OEDs will fall within this category of unavoidably
unsafe products.
B. Designer or Manufacturer: What’s in a Name?
CAD software plays an integral and vital role in the overall design
and manufacturing of an OED. The OED design (CAD print file) plays
Id. at 1036. Where the court reasoned that: “Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They
are graphic depictions of technical, mechanical data. The best analogy to an aeronautical chart is
a compass. Both may be used to guide an individual who is engaged in an activity requiring certain
knowledge of natural features. Computer software that fails to yield the result for which it was
designed may be another. In contrast, The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms is like a book on how to
use a compass or an aeronautical chart. The chart itself is like a physical "product" while the "How
to Use" book is pure thought and expression”.
52
Corley v. Stryker Corp., 2014 WL 3375596 *1 (W.D. La. 2014).
53
Id. at 3-4.
54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, comment k (1965).
55
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P. 2d 297 (Idaho Supreme Court 1987) at 305; See also
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 1096, 42
L.Ed.2d 688 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968);
Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D. S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.
1969); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App.3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465 (1985);
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 384 (N.J. 1984); See also Victor Schwartz, Unavoidably
Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE
L.REV. 1139, 1141 (1985); Sidney Willig, The Comment k Character: A Conceptual Barrier to
Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L.REV. 545, 575 (1978).
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a key role in regulating the scaffold’s mechanical properties, cell
growth, behavior, and differentiation.57 A sophisticated CAD print file
almost eliminates waste of printing materials and, thus, reduces costs
significantly.58 While materials, and processes used in OED 3D
bioprinting can still be approved by the current regulatory system, the
nature of the role that a CAD print file plays raises many new issues,
the most pertinent of which is establishing who should technically take
the title of ‘OED manufacturer’. Given the undisputed impact of the
CAD software, should the producer of the CAD print file (CAD user)
be considered as the manufacturer or semi-manufacturer of the OED?
The FDA defines a manufacturer as “any person who designs,
manufactures, fabricates, assembles, or processes a finished device.”59
The term ‘manufacturer’ includes, but is not limited to, those who
perform the functions of “contract sterilization, installation, relabeling,
remanufacturing, repacking, or specification development, and initial
distributors of foreign entities performing these functions.” 60 When
regulating Mobile Medical Apps, the guidance document of the FDA
provides that a Mobile Medical App manufacturer is “anyone who
initiates specifications, designs, labels, or creates a software system or
application for a regulated medical device in whole or from multiple
software components.”61 Should developers who produce CAD
software exclusively for the purpose of bioprinting OEDs, without
engaging in the manufacturing methods, be considered manufactures
(fabricators)? Following on from that question, how should CAD users
who are engaged with the bioprinting process (manufacturing) be
considered?
It is not yet clear whether CAD developers will be subject to
design claims under strict liability rules. As mentioned before in this
article, computer software is generally considered to be a service rather

57

Cho, supra note 5, at 5-2.
Mathew Varkey & Anthony Atala, Organ Bio printing: A Closer Look at Ethics and Policies,
5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POLICY 275, 277 (2015).
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21 C.F.R.§820.3(o) (2017).
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FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Mobile Medical Applications, CENTER FOR DEVICES AND
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 9 (Feb. 9, 2015) (available at:
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than a product;62 though it is possible to treat mass-marketed software
as a product under the UCC.63
Cases seeking compensation for damage caused by allegedly
defective software are increasingly proceeded as breach of warranty
under the UCC. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS is a
good example of a case in which it was pleaded that defective software
constituted a breach of warranty.64 In the context of defective CAD
print files, however, injury will most likely be suffered by nonpurchasing third parties, such as patients, rather than the healthcare
provider that actually purchased the defective software. While the
plaintiff might allege that their injury was caused by defective CAD
print file design, it may be difficult to ascertain the true cause of
injury.65 If the software is licensed, the plaintiff has the option to bring
suit against the manufacturer of the OED designed using CAD software
who, in turn, can seek contribution or indemnification from the CAD
software provider under breach of warranty and other contract-based
theories.66 An interesting question is whether a healthcare provider can
be vicariously liable for the actions of a CAD user who fails to meet
industry standards, even where the CAD user was acting as an
independent contractor.67 This is particularly important given that nonmanufacturing software developers are not liable for defects in their
software. The healthcare provider also must ensure that the CAD print
file is properly uploaded to the bioprinting machinery and that the
62

Sys. Am., Inc. v. Rockwell Software, Inc., No. C 03-02232 JF (RS), 2007 WL 218242 (N.D. Cal.
2007); Pearl Invs. LLC. v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352–53 (D. Me. 2003).
63
See e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp, 925 F. 2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991), Data Processing Serv;
v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N. E. 2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Rottner v. AVG Techs. USA, Inc.,
943 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230-31 (D. Mass. 2013); Sys. Design & Mgmt. Info., Inc. v. Kan. City Post
Office, 788 P.2d 878 (Kan. App. 1990). However, the 2005 revisions to UCC §§ 9-102 and 2-105
exclude information from the definition of goods and also define computer software as including
any support information provided in connection with the transaction. See U.C.C.§§9-102, 2105(1) (2005). Though, UCC cases focus on products as goods involving economic losses rather
than personal injuries. Advent Sys. Ltd., 925 F.2d at 672; RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772
F.2d 543, 544 (9th Cir. 1985); Wachter Mgmt. Co., 144 P.3d 747, 749-50 (2006); Olcott Int’l
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Mgmt. Info., Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees, 788 P.2d 878, 879 (1990); Rottner, 943
F. Supp. 2d at 224.
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Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Myriad France SAS, 850 F.Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. III. 2012).
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A notable case in this context is In re Toyota Motor Corp- Unintended Acceleration Mktg.,
2013 WL 5733178 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
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See generally, David Vladeck, Machines without Principles: Liability Rules and Artificial
Intelligence, 89: 117 WASH. L. REV. 146 (2013).
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Unless the hospital explicitly informs patients that the designer of the CAD files is not hospital
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bioprinting process runs correctly. Assuming that OED bioprinting can
be supervised by a technician – the person in charge of the department
that does the bioprinting or a physician, the healthcare provider might
be held liable for bioprinting-related defects, since it has a duty to
supervise the quality of the 3D bioprinting processes administered in
its premises.
In addition to the production of the CAD print file, the sale of
biological and other solvable and non-solvable materials, such as
synthetic polymers and natural polymers, is not a discrete isolated
event in 3D bioprinting. A 3D bioprinted OED cannot sensibly be
subject to expectations of uniformity. After all, even natural organs
sometimes suffer catastrophic failure. Due to the complexities of the
manufacturing and utilization process, therefore, in the absence of fault
on part of the healthcare professional, the source of a defect in a
bioprinted OED cannot always be traced to a single component of
manufacture, be it the CAD print file (defective software might work
seemingly well), the biomaterials, the bioprinting methods, or the
advanced professional skills needed to productively bring these efforts
together.
Determining what is a proper test to detect a CAD software defect
is an unresolved and contentious issue. Limited jurisprudence permits
assertion of implied warranty against healthcare providers whenever
there is a sale of a product under the UCC.68 In all cases, identifying
the manufacturer is an important first step. Characterizing the CAD
user as a manufacturer, even where the CAD print file production and
bioprinting methods are performed by the same entity, might not be
tenable. Due to the peculiar nature of healthcare provision, the
overwhelming majority of courts are reluctant to abandon the
malpractice concept and, thus, are unwilling to extend the principle of
strict liability to healthcare providers on grounds that the “utility of and
the need for them, involving as they do, the health and even survival of
many people, are so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in
the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of
the rules of strict liability in tort.”69
Measured against these principles, should the principle of
exempting the developers of customized software from the rules of
strict liability apply to software developers and healthcare providers
alike? Whitehurst v. American National Red Cross provides interesting
68

See, e.g., M.C. Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823 (Ala. 1984).
Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); See
also Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 381 (N.J. 1984); Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379,
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insight. The plaintiff in this case sought to recover damages for injuries
that she sustained when she contracted homologous serum hepatitis,70
alleging that the furnishing of impure blood constituted a sale within
the Uniform Sales Act.71 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
adding that an extra charge for blood is not indicative of a sale.72 The
court stated that administering a blood transfusion is “not a sale from
which an action for breach of implied warranty will lie.”73 Incidental
use of a product, such as placing a prosthesis in a patient’s mouth, does
not constitute a ‘sale’ of a device, as required for a cause of action
sounding in product liability.74 Hospitals, as healthcare providers, are
not engaged in the ‘business of distributing’ products.75 One of the
requisites, which the Restatement prescribes for the imposition of strict
liability, the court reasoned, is that “the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such product.”76 Hospitals are not subject to strict liability
for “latently defective product[s] supplied . . . by another for . . . use in
rendering treatment.”77 With the above descriptions in mind, two
important issues must be considered. First, it seems that the production
of a CAD print file by a healthcare provider constitutes the
performance of a medical ‘service’.78 Does it follow, however, that the
performance of such a service by a healthcare provider categorically
does not give rise to an action for breach of warranty? If so, who bears
liability for claimed defects in a CAD print file that was made
exclusively under the control of a healthcare provider and used in
clinical procedures within its premises? The answers to these questions
rest, among other issues, on the level of personalization by the CAD
user that is needed to create a CAD print file, which is used by a
manufacturer, to bioprint an OED. A personalized CAD print file is
unlikely to be subject to strict liability rules.
The personalization of OED bioprinting clearly blurs the line
between the principles of negligence and strict liability. In this context,

Whitehurst v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584, 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). A similar
conclusion was reached in Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 329 (1964).
Maintaining a steady stream of blood supply was the rationale behind the rulings of those cases.
See, Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 680 (1985).
71
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72
Id. at 586.
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Pierson v. Sharp Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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it is the hospital, (healthcare provider) that is likely to handle most of
the bioprinting process, including the CAD print file production.
C. To Regulate or Not to Regulate?
The complexity of using CAD software for 3D bioprinting is
likely to place a strain on the current infrastructure of software
development regulation. Agency theory teaches us that, although
certain innovations can disrupt existing industries, traditional
rulemaking and adjudication are, nonetheless, not the best answer to
face this disruption.79 Tim Wu argues that ‘threats’, when posed in
guidance documents, are a more suitable means of seeking to avoid
premature regulation than poorly formed or premature laws. 80 In
essence, fears regarding economic growth and regulation compliance
might ultimately be the most effective means to persuade healthcare
providers to adopt a ‘workable’, albeit incoherent, up-to-date quality
design. A recent study conducted by the FDA revealed that compliance
with medical regulations does not necessarily ensure the highest
possible quality of final health outcome for the patient.81 Similarly,
having well-formed legal/technical definitions in the design documents
of source code of the CAD software does not necessarily guarantee
fault-free software; defective CAD software can sometimes result from
sound technical definitions in the CAD source code.82 While clear
industry standards would help in early identification of potential coding
defects,83 it is unusually challenging for a government agency to be
sufficiently omniscient to be able to predict scenarios that may require
legal attention in advanced technology industries such as 3D
bioprinting.
Despite its advantages described above, a ‘threats’ policy brings
the risk of suboptimal long-term regulation;84 the software-based
medical device industry is a notable example. For almost three decades,
the FDA has struggled to develop a comprehensive regulatory initiative
for innovative medical products.85 A prominent example is the Therac79

See generally, Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841, 1842 (2011).
Id. at 1851.
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Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH L. J.:175, 179 (2014).
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25 incident in 1986-87, which led to a number of legislative and
regulatory initiatives.86 Following this incident, in 1987 the FDA
published its Draft Policy Guidance for the Regulation of Computer
Products.87 Despite the growing and critical role of software in patient
safety, the FDA never finalized their draft guidance, thus failing to
transform it into a long term strategy; the draft guidance was finally
abandoned, 18 years later, in 2005.88 In 2013, the FDA published
another guidance document that this time addressed issues related to
software devices embodied in smartphones.89 Thus, the FDA’s
‘threats’ policy has been used as a long-term strategy to address
software-related issues in the medical field,90 partially replacing
rulemaking and adjudication. Given the highly uncertain nature of
software innovations and the associated risks of embarking on
premature regulatory exercises, the FDA’s conventional wisdom has
been to rely on guidance documents rather than decisive regulation.91
The FDA continues on this path despite the ever-increasing number of
critical safety incidents that involve software defects, with as many as
a few hundred patients injured in radiation incidents that were caused
by either software or user error, just as happened in the Therac-25 case
around thirty years ago.92
There is no reason to believe that the FDA’s regulatory approach
to OED manufacturing and use will be any different to that taken for
software in general. The FDA is likely to rely on its tentative, shortCosmetic Act of 1938 was a reaction to increasing public concern and dissatisfaction with
ineffective and sometimes unsafe medical device. Today’s premarket approvals for drugs (
PMAs) came into being on the aftermath of the Thalidomide medical disaster struck in Europe.
Again, after the Dalkon Shield Instrauterine device caused injuries to thousands of women,
legislators responded to the disaster by the creation of the Medical Device Amendments;
requesting medical devices to be premarket approved. See, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, Sulfanilamide Disaster, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (June 1981),
(Sulfanilamide killed almost a 100 people). See also, Vogel, supra note 12, at 14.
86
A number of cancer patients received massive X -ray overdoes during radiation therapy which
led to a number of inquiry to identify potential faults and things that could go wrong with software.
See Vogel, supra note 12, at 15.
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Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 FED. REG. 36, 104 (Sept. 25,
1987)
88
Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug Administration, 70
FED. REG. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005); see also Cortez, supra note 84, at 181.
89
Mobile Medical Applications. Guidance for Industry and Food
and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocumen
ts/ucm263366.pdf.
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term approach and publish a number of draft guidance documents to
regulate CAD software in the 3D bioprinting field; these documents
will likely be used, by default, in the long-term, ultimately leading to
suboptimal regulation for this emerging industry.93 The public interest
in human healthcare demands, however, that regulators maintain their
efforts in the face of disruptive 3D biotechnologies. While avoiding
technological initiatives that would discourage innovation in this field
is paramount, some kind of regulatory intervention is also needed,
particularly for industries in which consumers cannot themselves
assess quality by personal inspection or experience.
II. RETHINKING SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIABILITY
The following proposal seeks to leverage the legal developments
in the fields of 3D bioprinting of OEDs and product liability in order
to improve the U.S.’s approach to the regulation of software design in
the medical sector. The proposal remains committed to the policy
decisions underlying the U.S. healthcare system while offering many
benefits to patients. Furthermore, it will lead to improved predictability
and lower costs for all involved parties, and minimize the incentive for
producing defective software.
A. The Need to Abandon the Products/Services Dichotomy
This section investigates the viability of adopting a policy-based
approach to determine whether the development of CAD software
deserves the protection of strict product lability. In a series of cases in
the U.S., a common law doctrine of strict liability in the medical field
has been developed. According to this series of cases, it is possible to
extend the scope of strict liability to certain pre-determined aspects of
CAD development. Under this approach, however, courts should be
willing to look beyond the traditional products/services dichotomy that
has, so far, shielded software development against strict liability law.
Clay v. Yates was the first case to examine mixed sales-services
transactions, albeit outside the context of 3D bioprinting.94. This case
involved labor as well as the necessary ‘incidental’ use of cloth and
paper, both of which would be incorporated in the final product: a book.
In this context, the court approached the interface between products
93

See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Regulatory Considerations for
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and services by pointing out that “the true criterion is, whether work is
the essence of the contract, or whether it is the materials supplied.”95
A more contemporary interpretation of this principle was
provided by the Eighth Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox.96 Here, the
predominant factor test was framed in the following manner:
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether [products
and services] are mixed, but… whether their predominant
factor, their thrust, their purposes,… is the rendition of
services, with products incidentally involved… or is a
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved.97
This significant policy-based statement, that a mixed transaction
should be assessed in its ‘essence’, could have a potent implication in
the CAD print file production process. More specifically, courts and
legislators will have to determine what is the essential quality of the
bioprinted organ: the CAD print file, bioprinting materials, bioprinting
methods, or some combination of the three.
In Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hospital, the court noted that it is
a “distortion to take what is a sale and turn it into a service, perhaps to
reach the desired result.”98 The court stated that “[i]n cases involving
products and other tangible physical materials which are in some way
bad, imposition of liability unquestionably enhances the public interest
in human life and health.”99
In Johnson v. Sears,100 a Wisconsin federal district court
unequivocally rejected the technical and artificial products/services
distinction as a basis for not imposing strict liability rules on hospitals
for the services they provide; the court stated that hospitals could be
held strictly liable for the ‘administrative rather than professional’
services they render. 101 How to best distinguish between professional
medical and administrative services, however, remains to be
determined; this is a distinction that should be made on an ad hoc
basis.102 The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that “the distinction
between a sale and the rendition of services is a highly artificial
one.”103 A similar conclusion was reached in Hoffman v. Misericordia
Hospital of Philadelphia, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
95
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96

56

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 35

contended that it did “not feel obligated to hinge any resolution of the
very important issue… raised [in this case] on the technical existence
of a sale.”104 Before that, the court in Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital also held that a hospital could be held strictly liable
for provision of contaminated blood.105
Differentiating between products and services for the purposes of
product liability requires a policy-based test. In Lowrie v. City of
Evanston106, the court stressed that the policy reasons underlying
“product liability . . . should be considered in determining whether
something is a product . . . rather than . . . the dictionary definition
of the word.”107 When determining whether something constitutes a
product for purposes of strict lability, the following policy reasons
should be considered: (i) the public interest in human life and health,108
(ii) the invitations and solicitations of the manufacturer to purchase the
product,109 (iii) the justice of imposing a loss on a manufacturer who
created a risk and reaped a profit,110 and (iv) the superior ability of the
commercial enterprise to distribute the risk of injury proximately
caused by the defective condition of its product by passing the loss onto
the public as a cost of doing business.111
This interpretation is in accordance with the Restatement (Third)
of Tort, which does not seem to discard such a possibility. When
considering the case of Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons in relation to the
use of computer software, it would appear that the reporters were
leaning towards extending strict lability to software, pointing out that:
“When a court will have to decide whether to extend strict liability to
computer software, it may draw an analogy between the treatment of
software under the UCC and under product liability law.”112
The Restatement (Third) provides that, even when provided
commercially, services are not products.113 Personalized softwarebased products, biological tissues, biological materials and human
organs are not considered products for the purposes of strict lability.
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The provision of a software-based product that is created at the request
of a specific patient, such as a CAD print file, is likely to be considered
as a service provision. In this context, customization means developing
software whose output is a software-based product for use by a single
or a small group of individuals. In the 3D bioprinting field, therefore,
the fate of defective CAD print files rests, among others, on two
dominant factors: (i) the level of customization required to fit a
patient’s specific needs; and (ii) the identity of the CAD user.
B. Against Extending Strict Liability Rules to Defective CAD
Print Files
This section raises the question of whether imposing strict
liability, rather than negligence, on facilities that produce defective
CAD print files is an efficient method to force CAD developers (in the
field of OED fabrication) to produce defective CAD software.
The theory of strict liability is based upon many economic policy
considerations.114 Most jurisprudences refrain from applying strict
product liability to software developers and medical professionals;
traditionally, medical professionals have only been liable for negligent
conduct. Apart from a few exceptions, courts in the U.S. have followed
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital 115 by exempting blood products
from the scope of strict liability. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hospital, however, rejected Perlmutter’s interpretation and held that a
hospital could be held strictly liable for providing a patient with
contaminated blood.116 This ruling led subsequently to the passing in
the U.S. of the so-called ‘blood shield statutes’ in which both warranty
and strict liability are inapplicable to blood transfusions. In accordance
with this approach, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that providing
medical services should not be equated with the task of selling
products: “Medical and many other professional services tend often to
be experimental in nature, depending on factors beyond the control of
the professional, and devoid of certainty or assurance or result. Medical
services are an absolute necessity to society, and they must be readily
available to the people.”117
Health care facilities are precluded from the scope of strict
liability for defective medical implants used within their premises for
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good reason; with Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc118
and Hoff v. Zimmer, Inc119 being just two of many notable examples of
such reasoning. Imposing strict liability on healthcare-related services
will increase the costs of providing those services and hamper progress
in developing new treatments and interventional techniques, thus
risking them becoming unaffordable to many patients.120 Policy
considerations that favor the application of the strict liability doctrine
on CAD software could be significantly undermined and outweighed
by the need for ready accessibility of essential healthcare services.121
These two arguments are, however, rebuttable.122 Analogously,
essential products, such as pharmaceuticals, are subject to strict
liability. Categorically exempting medical software development from
the scope of strict liability can only be justified where doing so would
discourage software developers from doing their jobs well, or where
the price of medical services would increase.123 Both of these
assumptions are yet to be substantiated quantitatively.
To summarize, applying stringent strict liability as a theory of
recovery in the software development setting might be
counterproductive. Under such a scenario, CAD developers might be
more willing to produce safe, yet not quite effective, software. In the
words of the Supreme Court of the United States: “State tort law that
requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer, but hence less effective,
than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no
less than state regulatory law to the same effect.”124 The Court stressed
that a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to determine, for
example, how many more lives will be saved by a device which, along
with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm.125
C. The Need for a Third Approach?
Conventional OED bioprinting involves a vast array of materials,
services, and products, often used in combination; examples include
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services by healthcare professionals, bio-ink, human tissue, biological
and non-biological materials, bioprinters, imaging facilities, patient
image data, and highly specialized CAD software, which is the focus
of this article. Can a healthcare provider be held liable for producing
defective CAD print files for use in 3D bioprinting? Common wisdom
and virtually unanimous holding of the courts is that defective CAD
software and CAD print files that are produced by a healthcare provider
are typically beyond the scope of strict liability.126 Here, one should ask
if a defective CAD print file supplied by a non-manufacturing entity
falls under the scope of strict liability. In this context, a distinction must
be made between standardized and personalized CAD print file
production. There might be room for advancing strict lability claims
against the producer of standardized CAD print files under the UCC.
However, customized CAD print files are typically exempt from the
scope of strict liability, even when sold commercially.127 If the
producer of the defective CAD print file and the manufacturer of the
OED are not the same entity, the distributor of the defective CAD
software might also be exempted from strict liability. Conventional
wisdom dictates that a ‘non-manufacturing’ seller or licensor of a
defective product is not strictly liable for harm caused by that defective
product.128
The only viable remaining option is recovery based upon the
theory of malpractice.129 Under negligence claims, four conditions
must all be met: duty of care, breach of duty, causation, and damages.
Here it is useful to ask whether the developer of CAD software used to
bioprint the OED should have a duty of care towards a specific patient.
It is possible that they should have a duty of care provided that two
conditions are met: (1) the patient suffers economic injury,130 and (2)
the CAD developer and the fabricator of the OED are the same
individuals/entity.131 This creates a new problem: while the
126
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manufacturer of a conventional product has a legal duty to use
‘reasonable care’ to mitigate foreseeable risks of injury to others, it is
unusually difficult for the CAD developer to predict all of the
‘reasonable dangers’ associated with the use of the OED, or to predict
the ‘unreasonable dangers’ for which they owe a duty to warn. In this
context, setting an industry standard of care is unusually difficult; the
full risks and benefits may not become apparent for many years. It is
not currently clear if it is tenable to impose a strict standard of care on
OED design and development processes in order to mitigate against the
manufacture of intrinsically dangerous OEDs. This lack of clarity is
due to the heavy burden of proof that is needed to demonstrate that
OED’s defects are attributable to negligence under traditional theories
of negligence. It is confounded by the large number of different
hypotheses, information, and conflicting literature.132 To complicate
this issue further, the benefits of the elaborate safety precautions that
are incorporated into CAD development may or may not always
outweigh the inhibiting effects on innovation, let alone the human cost
and development delay.
Satisfying the high threshold requirement of causation could
constitute an exceptionally challenging legal hurdle. Latent design or
bioprinting defects could take weeks, months or years to negatively
impact patient health. This issue is complicated by the fact that it is not
always possible to associate organ failure with bioprinting methods
(manufacture), defective CAD software, or defective biomaterials.
For these reasons, the complexities of proving causation and
negligent conduct in 3D bioprinting design defect cases could be
powerful disincentives to pursuing a claim. The limits of clinical trials
in predicting adverse effects over time are a potent factor that further
complicates the process of establishing negligence. The use of 3D
bioprinted organs introduces unique challenges that severely limit the
potential to undertake clinical trials. For example, it is difficult to
perform a randomized clinical trial on patients who have received
personalized OEDs since each OED is designed to treat the specific
clinical circumstances of only that single patient; this makes it difficult
to provide a reliable control group. Furthermore, inconsistent evidence
standards applied to conventional medical devices, along with diverse
regulatory standards, could inadvertently introduce avoidable risks to
patients in need of 3D bioprinted organs. Such an unpredictable
liable for product defect. See, James Beck & Anthony Vale, Drug & Medical Device Product
Liability Desk Book §8.09 (2016).
132
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environment also sends strong disincentives to investors in this
emerging field. The general medical condition of the patient in need of
a bioprinted OED can pose acute evidential difficulties. So, too, can
uncertainty over the appropriate defendant(s), be it the CAD user, the
physician(s) monitoring the bioprinting methods, the healthcare
provider responsible for bioprinting the organ or a combination of these
individuals/entities.
III. MOVING FORWARD: AN AD HOC APPROACH TO EXTEND THE
LIABILITY OF DEFECTIVE CAD DESIGN
Neither strict nor negligence theories of liability seem to properly
fit the needs of the OED software. Applying a stringent strict liability
to CAD design and development processes can lead CAD developers
to deploy safe, but not necessarily effective, software. Proving
professional negligence, on the other hand, is likely to be an unusually
strenuous legal process. For these reasons, this article proposes a third
policy-based approach as a basis for imposing liability on the
developers of defective CAD software.133 Under this approach, instead
of making the artificial distinction between products/services, liability
rules ought to be based on whether the step performed or service
rendered is administrative/technical or professional (a purely medical
service).134 Only administrative and technical services should to be
subject to strict liability rules. The distinction between professional and
non-professional (administrative and technical) services is a
consideration that should be made on an ad hoc basis. The next section
will use a set of economic and technical justifications to make the case
for this ad hoc approach.
A. Economic Considerations
The rationale of economic efficiency is frequently used to justify
the imposition of strict liability.135 It is believed that, once identified,
liability should be placed on the party that was most capable of
preventing the defect in the first place. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.,136 in his concurring opinion, Justice Traynor outlined this
economic rationale, pointing out that “even if there is no negligence,
however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever
it well most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
133
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defective products that reach the market.”137 Reducing the defect rate
to an acceptable level, therefore, necessitates two interrelated
requirements: (1) identification of a cost-effective action that can be
used to prevent the defect and (2) identification of the party that was
most ‘effectively capable of preventing’ the defect in the first place.138
In other words, the party with the greatest control and knowledge of
the product should bear ultimate responsibility for its defects.
Since software defects originate from the development process,139
it is perhaps logical to focus our attention on the design and
development stages of CAD software. From a policy standpoint, it is
100 times cheaper to correct software defects early rather than late in
the development lifecycle,140 irrespective of the potential cost of
human harm or even death. From this perspective, adequate penalties
should be imposed on CAD developers in the hope that this will deter
serious misconduct more effectively than imposing a fault-based
system, provided that two conditions are met: (1) there is an
unacceptably high incidence of defective CAD software development,
and (2) there are economically viable penalties for developing
defective CAD software available.
Under this welfare argument, an acceptable reason to extend strict
liability to the ‘administrative/technical’ aspects of CAD software
development is that the developer is in an enormously strong position
to cost-effectively discourage the development of defective software.
The position of the developer is so strong that a commercial software
development company can realistically discourage the production of
defective software at relatively low cost. Strict lability law could serve
its many goals by extending its scope to administrative/technical design
as well as the development of CAD software in the 3D bioprinting
field. In contrast, if the cost of extending strict liability to these steps
were to be unacceptably high, or where doing so would sustainably
restrict access to affordable healthcare in other ways, other reward
approaches should be considered.
B. Technical Considerations
Software power is ubiquitous. The use of advanced software today
extends into the medical field and impacts on our daily health, with
OEDs being an excellent example. The consequences of using
137
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defective software in the medical field can be far reaching, especially
in cases where patients suffer real physical harm. As demonstrated by
the experience of the North American Space Agency (NASA) on July
22, 1962, a small coding error can lead to serious consequences- a
missing hyphen, among other reasons, led the Mariner spacecraft to
spin wildly out of control.141 In fact, defective software development
is the single most important for software failure. Currently, a host of
software defect mitigation methods are implemented; of particular
interest are software verification and validation methods.142 In the
context of OED manufacture, software verification focuses on
providing ‘objective evidence’ that the design outputs of a particular
piece of CAD software meets all specified requirements for proper
OED bioprinting, ensuring consistency, completeness, and correctness
of the bioprinting methods. In contrast, software validation focusses on
examination and provision of objective evidence that the final
bioprinted OED meets patient requirements and expectations. Software
validation goes beyond mere software testing to address issues related
to best engineering practices, software development, and testing. 143
A significant and likely challenge in the field of OED bioprinting
will be to establish how much ‘evidence’ is required to verify and
validate CAD software whose output is a CAD print file for use in OED
manufactureing. The complexity of a validation system for CAD
software of this nature should be commensurate with the risk posed to
the patient by automated bioprinting, in addition to the risks imposed
by other factors, such as the use of synthetic and organic material.
Ultimately, the quality of a 3D bioprinted OED is strongly dependent
on the complexity of the CAD software, the CAD print file design, and
bioprinting methods (manufacture).
An interesting question is whether mathematical modeling used
to optimize the print file and predictions before bioprinting should be
accepted as ‘documented evidence’ that the manufactured OED is
likely to ‘consistently lead to the expected results’ and, thus, comply
with relevant regulations. This is important for two reasons: (1) 3D
bioprinting relies on mathematical modeling to optimize CAD print file
design before bioprinting;144 and (2) a significant number of medical
141
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device recalls in the U.S. are due to defective software.145 In fact, more
than 50 percent of all medical device recalls are reportedly due to
failures in product design and manufacturing process control.146 This
issue is likely to become even more acute given the critical role of CAD
software in 3D bioprinting.
In 3D bioprinting, CAD software validation requirements should
reflect the stated or implied needs of the patient receiving the OED. In
this respect, testing that uses only mathematical modeling is unlikely
to satisfy the full validation requirements. The overwhelming majority
of software cannot be fully tested for every potential pathway
combination through the source code.147 It follows, therefore, that not
all 3D bioprinting CAD software defects can be fully tested for every
potential pathway combination through the source code. For this
reason, a combination of other 3D bioprinting-related verification
techniques that take into consideration the OED development
environment, the application, and the risk to patients are likely required
to ensure comprehensive validation. This is extremely important given
that software defects usually occur without warning, where latent
defects may be hidden until long after the software is reached in the
market.148
C. Why CAD Print File?
A scientist or medical device engineer commences the analysis of
software-based medical devices with a statement of the following
nature: “I don’t trust software…software -any software- is probably
going to fail in some way when I use it, and probably when I need it
most. I’m rarely disappointed in that regard.”149 Software development
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for medical devices is more technically demanding than software
development for consumer electronics150 since the frequently short
lifecycle of consumer electronics often allows consumer acceptance of
lower standards of software robustness.
The important function of CAD software lends it an indisputably
specific character. It is challenging to determine whether an OEDrelated injury is caused by either defective CAD software or bioprinting
hardware. It is not clear whether it would be possible to accept that a
bioprinted OED defect was caused by defective CAD software without
establishing that the same CAD software used to bioprint an OED for
person A (without defect) also resulted in the defect of which person B
complains. This raises the pivotal question of when, if at all, an
implantable OED can be regarded to be defective when it does not
belong to a group that has a proven and significant risk of failure, or in
which a significant number of examples of the same model product
have been defective, as is the case when assessing defects in
conventional medical devices. This is why the concept of defective
software is fundamental to the application of specific rules governing
strict liability to a pre-determined administrative/technical aspect of
CAD software development.
In cases whereby defective CAD
software causes patient injury, and where it is unreasonably
challenging to attribute fault to a particular party, forming a response
that best serves the collective interests of all affected stakeholders is an
important first step. Under the malpractice regime, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to satisfy the high legal threshold that a physician failed to
comply with the local standard of care, or that the CAD software was
defective. For example, a patient would have to demonstrate that
defective CAD software would benefit from incremental modifications
that would improve the quality of the final 3D bioprinted OED, and
that the value of the resultant improvements to patient health would be
equal to, or more than, the added cost of the modified CAD software;
this requires a quantifiable economic to be placed on patient health.
Furthermore, it would be unusually challenging to prove that the
suggested improvement to the CAD software would, in reality, yield
the expected improvement to patient health. Here, the patient would
need to employ an expert software developer to demonstrate that the
improved software is technologically feasible.
It is fair to argue and even to assume that the safety and efficacy
of CAD software that is used in OED manufacturing is paramount to
patient health, and it should outweigh time-to-market considerations.
However, despite the already heavy regulation of invasive medical
150
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devices, where regulatory oversight covers the development stages as
well as the final product, safety and efficacy are sometimes influenced
by other pertinent factors. Ideally, OED manufacture requires
reasonably lengthy and onerous evaluation to ensure safety, quality,
and effectiveness; this is unlikely to be well received by the 3D
bioprinting industry. Lengthy evaluation shortens the most lucrative
period for a heavily patented industry; although granted U.S. patents
have a 20 year term in the case of devices (supplementary protection
certificates however are available for some pharmaceuticals and
agrochemical),151 methods, or printing methods, the period during
which a 3D bioprinted invention can be marketed is normally much
shorter, due to the lengthy development period. Enforcing rigorous
safety standards takes valuable time and, thus, risks compromising the
economic value of the patented product. For these reasons, it is likely
that the 3D bioprinting industry will push hard to obtain shorter review
times and decreased administrative requirements for individually
licensed OEDs.152 Furthermore, broader policy issues are raised by
commercial priorities, as well as the extent to which the private sector
controls research, production, and marketing of 3D bioprinted OEDs.
As already mentioned, the use of 3D bioprinted OEDs introduces
challenges that render randomized controlled clinical trials difficult
due to the inherent personalization of each individual OED. The
unavoidably commercial incentives might encourage CAD developers
to end software testing prematurely at the detriment of patient
wellbeing. For these reasons, the formation of a system of strict
liability, completely uncoupled from notions of fault or malpractice,
for a selected group of administrative and technical CAD development
steps is desirable.
CONCLUSION
Cadaveric donors are currently the main source of human
transplant organs.153 With the exception of cornea transplantations,
transplant timing is critically tight; for example, donor hearts and lungs
are viable for transplantation for fewer than six hours.154 Alternative
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options to whole organ transplants include the possibility of
transplanting cells directly into the target area to replace damaged
tissue; this option is currently problematic due to the often high rate of
transplanted cell death, which can be as high 50-90 percent in cases of
ischemic cardiac disease cell transplant. Indeed, more than 90 percent
of transplanted cells usually die within one week of transplantation for
a number of reasons.155 In this context, 3D bioprinted OED implants
might be regarded as a cure when conventional therapies have failed,
are unavailable, or are unsuitable. Thus, it is important that the growth
of innovative 3D bioprinting is encouraged.
Effective 3D OED bioprinting offers the promise of bridging the
current shortage of donor organs, thus enhancing patient quality of
care. Creating a streamlined approach to assessing the requirements of
effective, reliable, and high-quality CAD software is an important first
step.
This article concludes by suggesting a potentially promising
approach for addressing the liability challenge for defective CAD
software in the context of 3D bioprinted OEDs. The proposed solution
would enable the public to bring tort actions against CAD developers.
To allow a claim however, courts should move beyond the superficial
differentiation of products and services; courts must allow stakeholders
to use the potential of tort law effectively and, equally importantly, to
curb the introduction of defective CAD software. Furthermore, a new
test for setting the boundaries and limits of strict liability in the field of
OED bioprinting is proposed. The strict liability regime offers several
advantages relative to negligence and/or malpractice regimes, which
can be utilized to enhance patient safety. The proposed approach avoids
the nearly impossible task of proving a breach in standard of care,
allowing stakeholders to benefit from clearer and lower evidentiary
standards. Equally significant, the cost factor of our proposal does not,
in principle, lead to an overreliance on technology, which would risk
defective outcomes or a reduction in the creation of would-be optimal
solutions.
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